PAST EDITORIAL .... Tay & Ingham, Assisted Suicide, and Lay Presidency
(from the AFP December Issue 1999)
Boo Hiss
by The Rev'd Gavin Dunbar
It is not a very liberal idea, but bishops do have a right and a duty to "banish and drive away from the Church all erroneous and strange doctrine" (Ordinal), together with clergy who preach it. It is not a very liberal idea, and hardly what one would expect from a fervent liberal like Michael Ingham. That he has fallen back upon it, not just to exclude some errant preacher, but the Archbishop of Singapore, and the Primate of South East Asia, Archbishop Moses Tay, from visiting St. Matthew's Church in Abbotsford, in the diocese of New Westminster, exposes the ambiguity of his own position.
Doubtless Ingham is moved by understandable concerns for the peace of his diocese. It is reported he "feared Tay would disrupt sensitive discussions within the Vancouver diocese over blessing same-sex unions and handling past abuse at church-run native-residential schools". "I'm all for theological diversity" he is reported to have said in the Vancouver Sun, "but I'm concerned his visit would harm my attempts to create dialogue and mutual listening in the diocese".
One can sympathize. Archbishop Tay, an outspokenly conservative charismatic Anglican, would likely inflame passions. But a bishop who admits only the most temporary submission to the law of the church submission only in letter, not in the spirit, for he openly campaigns against the law of the church has little moral authority by which to invoke laws against those who hold opposite views. Having abandoned the unity that is found through common submission to the rule of law in matters of doctrine and discipline, Ingham must resort, as such lawless liberals do, to bureaucratic power to keep their piece of the institution from blowing apart. In the end, these liberal clerics, so quick to decide matters of doctrine and discipline by majority vote, are seen to favour "managed democracy", in which only the revolutionary agenda gets the full weight of the episcopal and synodical process.
The Economist on Assisted Suicide
by The Rev'd Gavin DunbarPerhaps it is part of an imperial legacy. The Economist magazine, published out of London, England, provides a more genuinely global newscoverage than its full-colour competitors in the news magazine business. Time, NewsWeek, MacLean's and their ilk often seem rather parochial, covering on those bits of the news that have grabbed North American TV time. And in its coverage of economic news, The Economist comes from a clearly-defined, and rather carefully thought-out, point of view (classical liberal, free-market). Intellectual rigour and reporting integrity tend to disappear when it turns to religious and ethical issues, where a limp libertarianism tends to prevail.
In matters economic, their clearly-defined, carefully thought through, and rigourously applied viewpoint is rather refreshing. The government of the economy cannot be carried out by the arbitrary selection of attractive options, for all choices carry with them certain inherent consequences. The economy has its own logic and dynamic, and one must learn to work with it rather than against it, or suffer the consequences. Their editorials are undaunted in encouraging public and private corporations to submit to the disciplines, and the chastistements, of the free market, as understood by classical liberal economic theory.
One could wish that something of the same clarity, care, and rigour were evident when they turned to matters religious and ethical. There The Economist embraces a mushy, libertarian subjectivism and relativism. Choices in this realm carry no consequences. It is all a matter of taste. The editors miss the point that just as there is an inherent logic to choices which governs the outward economy of material goods and services; so there is an inherent logic to choices which governs the inward economy of the soul.
Thus, in a recent essay on doctor-assisted suicide, the reader had to put up with glib and superficial theologizing (typical of English academics and pundits at their worst) like this:
"All these notions [i.e. religious arguments against suicide] aim to say that God has entrusted us with our lives, and that we have no right to repudiate that trust. But all are vulnerable to the objection that God has also supposedly given man free will, and if the "gift" of life has become so onerous, if it is one of excruciating pain and unending misery, for example, is the recipient really obliged to be so grateful? Who is morally culpable in this case, the person who wants to return this poisoned chalice, or the omnipotent and omniscient God who has chosen to impose it on the hapless recipient?"
The writer has simply erected a straw man which he identifies with the Judeo-Christian or religious argument, and then proceeds to knock him down. One might think from reading this that the Judeo-Christian tradition has nothing to say on suffering on the predicament of desolate and comfortless suffering explored in the psalms, in the prophets, in the book of Job, in the passion narratives of the gospels, and in the epistles. The writer has simply abstracted one argument from the larger tradition, and pretended that it is meant to stand on its own apart from other aspects of that tradition. Somewhat similarly, he has used the idea of "free will" as if it meant "freedom from obligation" but what Christian theologian ever said that free will consisted in an absolute moral autonomy?
With such sophistical reasoning as this does The Economist dismiss the religious arguments. In the next paragraph, for instance, it invokes Hume, the great Scottish philosopher, against other religious objections, and concludes: "if one accepts the deist view of God as a 'watch maker' who sets the world ticking and then does not intervene, Hume's conclusion seems irrefutable". Perhaps if one accepts the deist view of God. But when has the deist view of God been accepted by the Church or indeed most serious Christian theologians?
Having indulged in such sophistry to dismiss the religious arguments against suicide, the essay ("Let death be my dominion" in October 16th issue) rather surprisingly then makes a strong secular argument against suicide. The novel idea of a "right to die" has been gaining a certain amount of support in western countries, with the Netherlands going so far as to permit doctors to assist suicides in certain cases. "So far", the essayist points out, "this "right" is usually discussed in a single, strictly limited context: terminal illness. And yet, if this right exists, what about suicide in general? Why should the right to die be confined only to the terminally ill or those in great pain? Does not everyone, including the hale and hearty, have the right to choose the timing and manner of their [sic] own death? And if they do, what right do the rest of have to disapprove of suicide, or to try to stop it?"
At present, the taboo against suicide remains strong and deeply engrained in western culture. "As a result, most discussion [of doctor-assisted suicide for the terminally-ill] has steered clear of the basic issue of whether suicide itself is right or wrong, or can ever be rationally chosen". However, "if voluntary euthanasia at the end of life becomes more widely accepted, it is likely that society's disapproval of suicide in general will come under greater scrutiny, if only because the dividing line between suicide in the case of the terminally ill and other kinds of suicide will become more blurred".
"The rationale usually cited...is that patients facing imminent death should have control over their own fate, and that a society which respects individual autonomy, as liberal democracies claim to do, should respect this most intimate and personal of decisions. On the face of it, this seems justifiable.
"But, in fact, the right to die is an idea with disturbing implications. Terminally ill patients are not the only people facing death. We all are. And if someone decides that life is no longer worth living because of physical or mental pain, rejection by others, humiliation, despair, or, for that matter, boredom then autonomy will mean little if they have to wait until they are in the grip of terminal illness to claim a "right" as basic as the right to die.
"But what is the nature of this right?...Is it a "positive" right, such as the right to health care, education or a minimum standard of living, requiring that others, usually via the government, assist anyone exercising it? Many voluntary euthanasia campaigners believe that the right to die should be a positive right, requiring doctors to assist those who want to die. A "negative" right to die would limit suicide prevention efforts .A "positive" right to die would require not just doctors, but the rest of us, to help suicides kill themselves.
"In their efforts to achieve a more humane end to life, euthanasia advocates have always recognised that they had to refute one "slippery slope" argument that allowing euthanasia and assisted suicide could lead to coercion of the old and ill and a hastening of their death to suit the living. But they also face another "slippery slope" which few have yet recognised that the arguments for euthanasia could lead to calls the for acceptance of suicide as morally valid not just for the terminally ill, but for many others as well. If the old taboo crumbles, what will replace it?"
At present, the very existence of the taboo against suicide permits the argument for voluntary, therapeutic euthanasia of the terminally-ill to be presented as simply a case of making a merciful exception to the general rule prohibiting suicide. Logically speaking, however, there is no great difference between the terminally ill and those who are not terminally ill. The right to die is necessarily a universal right; and once the taboo is eroded in practice, by granting the right to some, the logic requiring that it be extended to all, will begin to work itself out. Thus human freedom is once again defined in terms of the right to kill (as in the abortion rights argument). What the current pope has named "the culture of death" is once more manifest.
A Pox on Both Their Houses
by The Rev'd Gavin DunbarReaders of this magazine know well that this editor often finds occasion to take the liberal establishment of the church to task for its pursuit of a revolutionary agenda. The outspoken bishop Michael Ingham, for instance, is frequently criticized (see above). It is a melancholy duty to find occasion to criticize the conservative evangelical diocese of Sydney, Australia, on the same basic ground, of pursuing a revolutionary agenda in this case, what is commonly called "lay presidency at the eucharist." In October, an ordinance to permit "the preaching and administration of Holy Communion by Lay persons and Deacons", for a trial period of five years, was passed in both the house of the laity and the house of the clergy by generous majorities (224 to 128 in the former; 122 to 66 in the latter), but was denied assent (as previous measures have been) by the Archbishop, Harry Goodhew.
There are two questions here, I think, a question about orders (about which I propose to say nothing others, perhaps, will deal with that question) and a question about law, which I think is likely to overlooked and therefore deserves comment. What is disturbing about the reasons given for passing the ordinance is that they tacitly assume the revolutionary lawlessness which until now has been most evident in radical liberal circles. It is held that a majority in synod that is, an activist minority in the Church has the power to remake fundamental laws of faith and order at will, in accordance with its reading of Scripture, its pragmatic agenda, and so on. That is to say, there is no fundamental law of faith and order in the Church which is beyond the power of the powers of the Church's bureaucratic process: no fundamental law that binds all members, and which confers upon synods and bishops the powers they have. Rather, the Church's governing bureaucracies are assumed to possess this power in and of themselves.
In adopting this assumption, the Sydney diocese shares common ground with its radical liberal opponents a common ground completely cut off from the very basis of Reformation Anglican ecclesiology, of a church in which all members including (as in the Church of England) the monarch in his capacity as governor of the church, and the bishops are subject to the rule of law. All are granted their authority by the law, all must exercise their authority under the law: in that common submission to law there is both unity and freedom for all members of the church.
The Archbishop cited three "matters" as shaping his decision: the synod's strong vote in favour of the ordinance; the constitution of the Anglican Church of Australia (which places such matters under the authority of General, not diocesan, synod); and the "impact on the Australian Church and the wider Communion". Goodhew said, "I am particularly sensitive on this [last] point because I have been engaged since Lambeth with other parts of the Communion arguing against unilateral action over crucial moral issues and attendant theological norms. To act unilaterally myself and without wide consultation would undermine my credibility in those ongoing debates".
It is hard to know where the weight falls in these three matters. The idea of the Church as being governed by law is only one of three, and the other two have nothing to do with law synodical majorities, and political advantage. Two out of three of these "matters" (as he called them) argued against assent. What would his decision be if two out of three had been in favour? It is perhaps a hopeful sign that the Archbishop chose the word "matters", rather than (say) "authorities" to describe the factors that "emerged as the most important in coming to my decision". It allowed him to acknowledge the strength of synodical sentiment without conceding it true authority. Nonetheless, it is clear that in the diocese of Sydney as in the diocese of New Westminster the idea of submission to a common law of faith and order is a wasting asset. Conservatives like those of the diocese of Sydney can prove as dangerous to the Church's integrity and identity as liberals.
Given the mindless egalitarianism promoted by the current idea of "baptismal ministry", one might expect liberal churchmen to embrace "lay presidency" as well. Logically speaking, the one follows from the other. Nonetheless, prepare for much violent invective against the diocese of Sydney from liberal quarters, focussing on that diocese's refusal to permit the ordination of women to the priesthood (although it does admit them to the diaconate). This measure will be seen as a duplicitous ploy to avoid ordaining women as priests. It seems therefore that the liberal church will (counter-intuitively) oppose lay presidency, and preserve priestly privilege, precisely because the latter provides a powerful symbol of women's empowerment.
A note on our Editor:
The Rev'd Gavin Dunbar was Rector of the Parish of Ecum Secum, Nova Scotia, and now serves as an associate priest in the parish of St. John's, Savannah, Georgia.
He is the editor of the Anglican Free Press, and past Vice-President of the Nova Scotia / PEI branch of the Prayer Book Society of Canada, and a former instructor at the Atlantic St. Michael's Youth Conference. He has written and lectured extensively on a range of topics, and has many god-children.